Bank of America’s Record Settlement: The tsunami of wrongdoing and excess that caused barely a ripple of inconvenience at the top.
The indisputable economic (and moral) fact of our time is that America’s most wealthy, from whom capitalism’s CEOs, directors, guardians and gatekeepers are drawn, not only allowed this torrent of financial chicanery and deception to occur, they profited handsomely from it.
These pages have voiced strong doubts over the years about the leadership and compensation practices that prevail at many of America’s corporations. Chief among the criticisms were that these plans provided incentives and rewards that caused companies to take improper risks which allowed CEOs to rack up huge gains in the short run while investors — and, ultimately, society — were left holding the costly bag of empty promises when reality came crashing down.
Take Bank of America, for example, which recently settled with the U.S. Justice Department by agreeing to pay a record $17 billion in penalties and restitution. In the long history of American business, there has never been anything approaching this outsized penalty. It stems from improprieties at Countrywide Financial, which B of A bought in another fit of misguided thinking, just before the onset of the Great Recession. There were also irregularities involving disclosures about its takeover of Merrill Lynch as well as with Bank of America’s own mortgage practices.
You might think that CEOs and boards are paid well for keeping companies out of trouble and avoiding these kinds of disasters. Half of that observation is certainly true. In the five years leading up to the crash of 2008 and the beginning of the worst recession since the Great Depression, B of A’s CEO Ken Lewis was paid more than $200 million. Each of the bank’s directors awarded themselves a minimum of $1.5 million in the same period. Many collected more.
When he retired in 2009, Mr. Lewis walked away with a further $83 million in retirement benefits. Others connected with B of A, such as former Merrill Lynch CEO John Thain and Countrywide Financial’s former CEO Angelo Mozilo, also made off with huge fortunes as a result of deals made with the bank under Mr. Lewis.
And for all that, one of America’s most prominent financial institutions did not walk — it ran — into the giant propeller of U.S. government in a predictable and avoidable financial collision that resulted in this staggering record payout.
Bank of America was, as we documented over the course of several years, far from alone in practicing financial acrobatics that were more suited to a travelling carnival than an iconic institution of capitalism. Yet in this mighty tsunami of boardroom wrongdoing and excess that nearly upended Main Street, barely a ripple of bother was felt among the first-class decks of Wall Street and America’s financial elites. No CEO has been sent off to jail. No director or chief executive has been forced to return any pay. As we noted in The Fallacy of Giants, in most cases when these kinds of eye-popping settlements are announced, the company’s stock shoots up. Government fines, no matter how staggering, and accusations of abuse and betrayal by top management and boards, no matter how shameful, are regarded by many business insiders and much of the market as just another cost of doing business.
The indisputable economic (and moral) fact of our time is that America’s most wealthy, from whom capitalism’s CEOs, directors, guardians and gatekeepers are drawn, not only allowed this torrent of financial chicanery and deception to occur, they profited handsomely from it. The result is that those same elites in the period between 2007 and now managed to gain an even larger choke hold on the wealth and income of America than at any time since the 1920s. This, despite the fact that were it not for the bailout provided by America’s taxpayers who largely live on Main Street, not only would this expansion of wealth not have occurred, but capitalism itself might not have survived. On that point, is it not interesting that the same voices that are generally quick to rail against government excess and demand fiscal discipline when it comes to the public purse are uncharacteristically silent when it comes to the $5 trillion the U.S. Fed paid to finance the bailout? Does that have any connection with reality, or is it just another case, like CEO compensation, for instance, where there is one set of ever accommodating rules for those at the top and another for everyone else?
What happened with Bank of America, and other prominent institutions like it, and the ease with which moral and legal improprieties can be sloughed off with little consequence for those in charge, is at the heart of the current record level of public disaffection with capitalism and those who lead it. Having spent nearly half a century working with and around capitalism and its leaders, it is hard for me to imagine that one day it may cease to exist. But the too often overlooked reality is that the fundamental currency that sustains modern capitalism is not capital at all — it is the consent of the public.
If present trends in income equality and corporate immorality continue, and its leaders fail to ensure that capitalism is governed by a set of values that is consistent with the needs and dreams of Main Street, it is hard to imagine how it will survive.
The Fallacy of Giants | Part Two
Essay by J. Richard Finlay
The blind eye which shareholders and analysts too long cast upon the abuse of excessive CEO pay is now being turned to the recent trend of monetizing ethical abuse. Who knows when the tipping point might come in the ever-widening wealth gap where capitalism is finally seen to cross the river of moral conscience and moves from being trumpeted as a source of social progress and individual incentive to one of middle class tyranny and public opprobrium.
Continuing from Part I
One of the defining features of today’s world of big business is that, too often, shareholders have been willing to turn a blind eye to any amount of pay to a CEO, no matter how disproportionate, as long as they were getting impressive returns each quarter. Never mind how many times poorly crafted compensation devices gave incentives to CEOs to artificially push up the stock when such growth could never be sustained in the long run. As I suggested to the U.S. Senate Banking Committee long before the financial meltdown that traced its roots in part to unsound compensation schemes:
The most corrosive force in modern business today is excessive CEO compensation. Such lofty sums tempt CEOs to take actions that artificially push up the price of the stock in ways that cannot be sustained, and to cash out before the inevitable fall.
Our comments on these pages and elsewhere over the years have also attempted to rebut the most common justifications frequently advanced by boards as to why CEO pay needs to be at the level to which it has skyrocketed.
But the inescapable lesson of history appears to be that no boardroom scandal or financial meltdown is so great, no gap in wealth or income is so wide, that it will deter CEO pay from its self-appointed destiny of creating the wealthiest professional class in the history of the world.
Now a view is emerging in many boardrooms and on Wall Street that appears to regard ethical and legal transgressions, even the kind that result in multi-billion dollar fines, penalties and settlements, as mere transactions. This is the case with JPMorgan Chase, whose profitability is so vast its shareholders are prepared to accept a record settlement with the U.S. justice department for $13 billion (among other penalties) as just another cost of doing business. The stock has risen 28 percent in the past 12 months. Other examples abound, including Bank of America’s $9.5 billion to settle government actions involving federally insured mortgages, $1.2 billion paid out by Toyota and $7 billion in penalties by drug makers GlaxoSmithKline, Pfizer and Abbot.
It is not as if the ethical and legal dimension of business has suddenly dropped onto the corporate landscape unexpectedly. There are more compliance officers and university think tanks on ethics than at any time in the history of business. Every publicly traded corporation has a code of ethical conduct. Company websites all make reference to being committed to the highest standards of ethics and honesty. Most CEOs will give an annual keynote speech somewhere showcasing the social responsibilities of their business. I’ve written many of them over the years myself. Enron had a stellar reputation for commitment to high ethical standards. Its CEO, Ken Lay, liked to be known as “Mr. Business Ethics.” But between the words and the actions of too many companies there falls an ethical shadow. It is much easier to simply assume a standard of ethical performance than it is to subject it to the scrutiny and testing it actually requires.
History is littered with the bleached remains of fallen giants, even of the corporate species. Nortel and BlackBerry not long ago led their industries. Today, one has vanished and the other is quickly disappearing. Some years ago another Canadian institution, Royal Trust, collapsed under the slumbering eyes of inattentive directors and stunned regulators. Livent was North America’s largest publicly traded theatrical entertainment company. But its most artistic accomplishment came in the form of the highly creative, but decidedly unlawful, accounting engaged in by its Toronto-based founders Garth Drabinsky and Myron Gottlieb, who both swapped the company’s swank Manhattan condo for sentences in a Canadian prison.
General Motors had a hammerlock on the North American auto market that was thought to be unbreakable, until it limped pathetically to the wicket of government assistance and declared bankruptcy. The “new” GM is today being rocked by the lingering effects of a culture that dismissed the risk of customer deaths from defective ignition switches as an acceptable business cost. Microsoft, once the dominant force in consumer software to the point where it actually fixed prices, has been reduced to selling software for competing Apple iPads on the rival iTunes store as consumers abandon its signature Windows software in droves. And to the pantheon of vanished business icons, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers are now fully inducted, as are their former leaders, Jimmy Cayne and Dick Fuld.
Like many other companies, they were lost to the all-too-common, but entirely avoidable, affliction of hyper-ego and deficient common sense. Before the crisis that claimed them, we often asked here if some of these companies actually had a real board of directors, since it seemed there was little evidence of them when they were most needed.
In situations like these, and in many others, when disaster strikes the board of directors typically professes surprise and claims to have no idea what could have caused it. Memo to board secretaries everywhere: Have a full-length mirror installed in the boardroom.
The idea that there are few outcomes that are not insurmountable when a company skates over ethical and legal boundaries, that a board can throw money at any type of egregious conduct to get past it, is fundamentally subversive to the well-being of both capitalism and society. It feeds the delusion, commonly held by many who enjoy great wealth and power, that certain companies are endowed with a financial shield so impenetrable it makes them invincible to the consequences of their actions. This same view creates a culture of moral hazard where the scale of the transgressions, and the costs necessary to remedy them, inevitably keep getting bigger and bigger until the unthinkable calamity occurs. As the lessons of the great financial crisis of recent years demonstrate, when the unthinkable does happen, the CEOs whose misjudgments caused it have long fled with their trove of stock options profitably cashed out, while ordinary shareholders, and occasionally taxpayers, are left to pick up the pieces.
Far more important than the loss of any one giant, however, is the integrity of the system of capitalism itself. Capitalism cannot survive if its leaders, guardians and gatekeepers remain willing to tolerate such costly misbehavior. Nor will society, whose support it requires, endlessly abide a system that does not convincingly demonstrate that it recognizes a sacred obligation to the public for upholding a standard of ethical conduct that goes well beyond what has been evidenced by many firms in recent years. Lest there be any doubt, twice in the past 100 years, capitalism has effectively turned to government for its very survival in what amounted to a public bailout from the epidemic of excess and misjudgments that led to massive job losses and social dislocation.
It would be the height of folly for the titans of Wall Street and elsewhere to conclude, as a result of these recent multi-billion dollar settlements, that they can simply write a cheque and continue on with business as usual whenever moral impediments stand in the way of increased profitability and outsized compensation.
Business has misjudged the reaction of society to a number of major issues over the years, from the dangers to food safety and the exploitation of child labor to threats to the environment and the need for safer cars. The results were not particularly welcomed by business nor were they predicted by it. And the business world did not exactly distinguish itself by the silence of its leaders in the early phases of the subprime meltdown or for presiding over an inadequately governed system that let America down to the point where corporate welfare through the generosity of government became capitalism’s only hope. When high profile tycoons like former GE CEO Jack Welsh and Home Depot’s billionaire co-founder Ken Langone bemoan the expressions of antipathy toward Wall Street and big business, voicing puzzlement over its cause, as they regularly do on CNBC, for instance, they betray a larger disengagement from the forces that shape the social and political dimensions of modern capitalism.
Who knows when the tipping point might come in the ever-widening wealth gap where capitalism is finally seen to cross the river of moral conscience and moves from being trumpeted as a source of social progress and individual incentive to one of middle class tyranny and public opprobrium. A firestorm of outrage may be in the waiting.
In that context, it is not unreasonable, and certainly not imprudent, to suggest that if a more fair and honest culture consistent with the core values with which America has always approached its concentrations of power, is not soon embraced, if the idea that ethical abuse can be monetized is not quickly dispelled starting with capitalism’s most valued icons, the costs to investors and to society will be measured in more than the Sagan-like billions and billions tallied thus far.
The Fallacy of Giants | Part One
on corporate integrity in the post-bailout era
Recent multi-billion dollar settlements involving Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase show the staggering costs of ethical folly and the culture of moral hazard that places too many companies, and capitalism itself, at risk.
It is the curse of giants to believe in their own invincibility. It is also the curse of their acolytes, as the White Star Line discovered with its “unsinkable” Titanic and the Philistines learned with the defeat of their champion Goliath at the hands of a young shepherd boy. Yet these lessons, and countless others, over millennia have not dispelled such illusions in the world of business, where size is seen as an insulator against all manner of misadventures and the too-big-to-fail mentality shows few signs of abating. Indeed, the extent to which America’s major banks and Wall Street icons were on the wrong track when it came to compliance with the law and standards of ethics during the great financial meltdown and even afterwards is becoming even more striking. Recent reports involving Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase vividly make the point.
On these pages in the years and months leading up to the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, and in numerous op-ed columns before that, I wrote about the dangers of relying on the myths of giants. Until they were categorized as being too big to fail, corporate monoliths like Bank of America, Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase were viewed as being too smart to fail. Trophy directors and fantastically compensated CEOs, with the assistance of huge PR departments that never seemed to sleep, worked overtime to present an image where success was virtually guaranteed. The reality, however, was that too many boards were recklessly disengaged from what was happening around them. Seeds of folly were being sewn by undersupervised employees more interested in creating clever short-term financial devices than sustainable building blocks of long-term business. And too many investors and journalists had become prisoners of what I call cheerleader capture. First cousin to the condition of regulatory capture, this refers to the state where it is virtually impossible for any dissenting voices to penetrate the thundering chorus of cheers by insiders and their loud choir of supporters.
There were warning signs of the unwise effects of that mindset, to be sure. Scandals involving security analysts, for instance, for which Henry Blodget became the poster-boy, revealed the dangers of a culture of cheerleader capture. In too many cases, the analysts who were supposed to be delivering objective assessments of the financial health of companies enjoyed personal and career incentives that caused them to paint a more glowing picture than justified by the facts. Citigroup was touched in several ways by that scandal.
There were the accounting frauds at Nortel, Enron and Worldcom that were so stunning they resulted in landmark legislation known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act being passed. The collapse of Hollinger and Livent provided an interesting coda to those scandals. If these events of just a few years earlier had been taken seriously, they would have produced a higher standard of boardroom oversight that might have prevented the blunders and financial chicanery that brought the world to the brink of the financial abyss in the first decade of the 21st century.
But even before the gales of that crisis rose to full force, this space questioned the governance practices of companies like JPMorgan Chase, Citigroup, Bank of America, as well as Countrywide and Merrill Lynch, two institutions which BofA bought. We took frequent issue with the sweetheart boardroom deals that propelled their CEOs into the super-compensation stratosphere. We felt that the excessive deference accorded many CEOs reflected a perilous level of disengagement on the part of boards which in turn were failing to exercise the independent judgment needed to fully protect investors and the public franchise of capitalism itself.
Many of the decisions these companies made were fraught with ethical failures, violations of the law and just bad business thinking. Their consequences are coming home to roost even years later. Bank of America recently agreed to pay $9.5 billion in fines to settle civil lawsuits with U.S. federal housing authorities. Ken Lewis, the company’s former CEO, settled with regulators by paying $10 million personally. All told, it has cost BofA some $50 billion to resolve a variety of claims stemming from the subprime era, including the fraudulent actions of Countrywide Financial and misleading statements made in connection with the bank’s purchase of Merrill Lynch.
Improprieties at JPMorgan Chase resulted in an astonishing $20 billion being handed over to various regulatory authorities. The amount barely caused a ripple on Wall Street, where reaction to the announcement registered nothing untoward in respect of JPMorgan’s stock or the reputation of its CEO, Jamie Dimon.
Citigroup, which has also paid out huge amounts to settle regulatory claims, recently failed the Fed’s financial stress test — for the second time in two years. Its stock languishes at the unconsolidated 1-for-10 equivalent of the same $5 range it was at during the bailout crisis. Were its recent history of losses, bailouts and scandals not sufficient, there are new regulatory and legal issues arising from a potential fraud involving Banamex, a Mexican subsidiary. In one day early this April, Citigroup’s shareholders were hit with a double whammy. The company said that it was unlikely to meet a key profit expectation it had set and then announced it was paying $1.12 billion to certain investors to settle claims stemming from mortgage securities sold before the financial crisis.
Yet the level of shareholder outrage one might think would be directed at Citigroup’s board for this Job-like litany of woes has, for the most part, failed to surface, just as tolerance of years of poor boardroom practices and bad decisions earlier led to a cascade of scandals and financial losses culminating in the bank’s liquidity crisis that prompted the U.S. government bailout in 2008.
In no case has any banking or Wall Street executive faced jail time as a result of the misdeeds that resulted in these record massive payouts or those of other companies. By contrast, in any given day on Main Street, courts routinely hand out jail sentences to elderly seniors convicted of shoplifting and single mothers who pass bad cheques for even small amounts.
Like the notion of billions and billions of stars in the cosmos often attributed to the late Carl Sagan (with the help of Johnny Carson), it is hard to get the mind around the scale of these fines, payouts and penalties. And in the case of Bank of America and JPMorgan Chase, and numerous other companies from drug makers to car manufacturers along the way, it seems nobody is even trying.
What seems to be happening instead is that the wrong-headed mindset that gave birth to excessive CEO pay has infected other fields of business responsibility and decision-making. We explore this further in Part II.
RIM Finally Runs Out of Shiny Objects
What is happening at RIM is sad for the company, its employees and investors. What is sadder, still, is that, just like what happened at three other now vanished Canadian icons — Nortel, Livent and Hollinger — it was avoidable, and almost entirely the product of management arrogance that was unstopped because of bad corporate governance.
We wrote about these same issues in these same companies long before anyone else because they foreshadowed the crisis that history predicted was coming. In RIM’s case, it was a lesson that even major shareholders who claim a strong commitment to good corporate governance, like the Ontario Teacher’s Pension Plan, were too blinded by the prospects of giddy returns to see. So they and others gave a pass to the weak board structure and the mesmerized cast of directors who bought into a loopy management style.
These are not popular positions to take, as we often discover. When we raised issues about RIM’s boardroom culture and ethically challenged top management — and we were the first on record to do so — a barrage of nasty, vindictive and occasionally threatening emails and telephone calls followed. RIM, it seemed, could do no wrong even when it did (remember the stock option backdating fiasco?), and absolutely no one was interested in hearing a critical word because of the company’s success at the time. “Who needs a board when you have Jim and Mike?” seemed to be how most saw it. No one considered for a moment that RIM’s success might be fleeting, least of all entranced directors on its board. But being a director, investor or analyst is about more than being a captive of a shiny object, whether it is a glittering gold watch or a spellbinding (co-) CEO.
Next on the agenda will be a succession of directors who start to bail out, not wanting their reputations to be tarnished when the Chapter 11 filing is made and not admitting that they, too, took too long to use their mentality to wake up to reality, as Frank liked to urge on Cole Porter’s behalf.
Early clues to RIM’s fast approaching demise, which is clearly underway as the stock hurtles toward the five-dollar mark, were there for all to see, as they were, and are, for many other companies. They always begin with how the boardroom culture dictates the exercise of power and accountability or whether it plays any meaningful role in that process at all. But that is a view that too many inside and outside the boardroom, often caught in a hypnotic state of denial on the one hand and over-deference to the beguiling CEO on the other, remain unwilling to see. A change in fortune can always happen to the beneficiaries of great success and especially to those who make the mistake of assuming previous success is a guarantee for future wins, as JPMorgan’s board is in the process of discovering today in its widening scandal of losses, and as GM’s, Nortel’s, Lehman’s and Penn Central Railroad’s directors before them learned the hard way. It seldom announces its impending arrival in a corporate wide email.
For those interested in learning more about the missed boardroom clues that brought RIM to the brink, our full series of 25 posts over the past six years can be found here.
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Happy Birthday, Canada. Having survived the theatrics of Conrad Black’s renunciation, the vanishing of the Canadians icons he once headed like Hollinger, Dominion Stores, Massey Ferguson and Argus, and now his coming back to your forgiving embrace after being a guest of the U.S. penal system, you can survive anything. More significant, however, and worthy of recognition and praise on such a day, is the sacrifice and courage shown by the men and women of Canada’s armed forces who serve to protect freedom and democracy here and in far off lands, along with their families who give so much. A different kind of war is fought daily at home as well by those who battle poverty, injustice and the tyranny that is often inflicted by power on the part of governments, corporations and the media when that becomes untethered from moral values and human decency. They seldom receive plaques or medals, unlike Mr. Black who continues to hold his Canadian distinctions despite disgracing them (it was on Canadian soil in Toronto that Mr. Black engaged in his obstruction of justice for which he was convicted in the U.S.). These foot soldiers of a civilized society represent in their often unremunerated and unsung work the best of what Canada stands for in the world.
“Catch Me if You Can” and Other Fine Relics from the Lehman Boardroom
Once again, an inept board escapes culpability through a Houdini-like contrivance called the business judgment rule, one of the most anti-shareholder and destructive of legal principles ever to emerge in modern times.
Lehman Brothers made a brief return in the news today, just long enough to fall into another abyss of folly and misjudgment that will leave its former shareholders and the investing public shaking their disbelieving heads. The appearance of the once-fabled but now bankrupt firm comes in the form of a report by the court-appointed examiner. As The New York Times notes today:
The directors of Lehman did not breach their fiduciary duties in overseeing the firm as it acquired toxic mortgage assets that eventually sank the firm, a court-appointed examiner wrote in a lengthy report published Thursday.
The report, by Anton R. Valukas of the law firm Jenner & Block, found that while Lehman’s directors should have exercised greater caution, they did not cross the line into “gross negligence.” He instead writes: “Lehman was more the consequence than the cause of a deteriorating economic climate.”
Here’s what Mr. Valukas wrote on the Lehman board’s conduct:
The examiner concludes that the conduct of Lehman’s officers, while subject to question in retrospect, falls within the business judgment rule and does not give rise to colorable claims. The examiner concludes that Lehman’s directors did not breach their duty to monitor Lehman’s risks.
We rather strongly disagree. As we pointed out months before the collapse of the company, Lehman Brothers was a poster child for how not to run a board. On the Lehman boardroom stage there was but one speaking part, that of CEO Richard Fuld. He also served as board chairman, as well as chairman of the powerful two-man executive committee. The only other member was 81-year-old John D. Macomber. The executive committee met 16 times in 2007, more often than the board itself or any other committee. Lehman’s finance and risk committee was headed by 80-year-old Henry Kaufman. It met on only two occasions during 2007 — the very time that Lehman’s destructive risk, debt and CDO time bomb was ticking away.
Five of Lehman’s directors were over 70. Most were hand-picked by Mr. Fuld. Many had no previous connection at all with Wall Street. The 83-year-old actress Dina Merrill was a member of Lehman’s board and its compensation committee for 18 years until 2007. And we know that Mr. Fuld was compensated exceedingly well, to the tune of some $354 million between 2002 and 2007 alone. Somehow it seems poetically symbolic for the kind of board Lehman was that Ms. Merrill (about whose acting career we were early young fans) should have appeared on What’s My Line? and starred in such movies as A Nice Little Bank that Should Be Robbed and, a perennial favourite of many corporate directors, Catch Me if You Can (original 1959 version).
You can read more about Lehman’s antiquated and dysfunctional board here.
Once again, an inept board escapes culpability through a Houdini-like contrivance called the business judgment rule. In our view, this doctrine has been shown time and again to be one of the most anti-shareholder and destructive of legal principles ever to emerge in modern times. Talk about the need to stand up for capitalism. There is no greater form of boardroom socialism than the business judgment rule. Time and again, those who otherwise claim to have the intelligence and experience to govern giant corporations, and are paid handsomely for the privilege, suddenly appear to have been deaf, dumb and blind in the face of the disaster that was approaching. They say they should not be held to account. They claim they didn’t know what was really happening. They stress that they tried their best. Sorry things didn’t work out. Could they have a note from the court now so the besieged directors could go home early?
Lehman’s directors even managed to get away with this spiel at a time when the world was reeling from the unraveling of credit markets, when subprime mortgages and derivatives were sending off toxic alarms everywhere and when generally accepted standards of sound governance strongly signalled that the Lehman board was a train wreck just waiting to happen.
Fortunately, the judgment rule has few parallels that protect other professionals in a similar fashion, or society would be in an even more frantic state than it is today. Unsurprisingly, this rule takes its origins from a time when the courts felt it only proper to defer to men of means and that nothing too arduous should be permitted to interfere with their avocational diversions.
Under this doctrine, you have to wonder, if Clarabell the Clown and the Marx Brothers had been kibitzing about while serving on the board of Lehman Brothers in the years before its collapse, would the examiner’s report have been any different?
On second thought, you don’t have to wonder. You have your answer.