There is no substitute for a culture of integrity in organizations. Compliance alone with the law is not enough. History shows that those who make a practice of skating close to the edge always wind up going over the line. A higher bar of ethics performance is necessary. That bar needs to be set and monitored in the boardroom.  ~J. Richard Finlay writing in The Globe and Mail.

Sound governance is not some abstract ideal or utopian pipe dream. Nor does it occur by accident or through sudden outbreaks of altruism. It happens when leaders lead with integrity, when directors actually direct and when stakeholders demand the highest level of ethics and accountability.  ~ J. Richard Finlay in testimony before the Standing Committee on Banking, Commerce and the Economy, Senate of Canada.

The Finlay Centre for Corporate & Public Governance is the longest continuously cited voice on modern governance standards. Our work over the course of four decades helped to build the new paradigm of ethics and accountability by which many corporations and public institutions are judged today.

The Finlay Centre was founded by J. Richard Finlay, one of the world’s most prescient voices for sound boardroom practices, sanity in CEO pay and the ethical responsibilities of trusted leaders. He coined the term stakeholder capitalism in the 1980s.

We pioneered the attributes of environmental responsibility, social purposefulness and successful governance decades before the arrival of ESG. Today we are trying to rebuild the trust that many dubious ESG practices have shattered. 


We were the first to predict seismic boardroom flashpoints and downfalls and played key roles in regulatory milestones and reforms.

We’re working to advance the agenda of the new boardroom and public institution of today: diversity at the table; ethics that shine through a culture of integrity; the next chapter in stakeholder capitalism; and leadership that stands as an unrelenting champion for all stakeholders.

Our landmark work in creating what we called a culture of integrity and the ethical practices of trusted organizations has been praised, recognized and replicated around the world.


Our rich institutional memory, combined with a record of innovative thinking for tomorrow’s challenges, provide umatached resources to corporate and public sector players.

Trust is the asset that is unseen until it is shattered.  When crisis hits, we know a thing or two about how to rebuild trust— especially in turbulent times.

We’re still one of the world’s most recognized voices on CEO pay and the role of boards as compensation credibility gatekeepers. Somebody has to be.

Once again, an inept board escapes culpability through a Houdini-like contrivance called the business judgment rule, one of the most anti-shareholder and destructive of legal principles ever to emerge in modern times.

Lehman Brothers made a brief return in the news today, just long enough to fall into another abyss of folly and misjudgment that will leave its former shareholders and the investing public shaking their disbelieving heads.  The appearance of the once-fabled but now bankrupt firm comes in the form of a report by the court-appointed examiner.  As The New York Times notes today:

The directors of Lehman did not breach their fiduciary duties in overseeing the firm as it acquired toxic mortgage assets that eventually sank the firm, a court-appointed examiner wrote in a lengthy report published Thursday.

The report, by Anton R. Valukas of the law firm Jenner & Block, found that while Lehman’s directors should have exercised greater caution, they did not cross the line into “gross negligence.” He instead writes: “Lehman was more the consequence than the cause of a deteriorating economic climate.”

Here’s what Mr. Valukas wrote on the Lehman board’s conduct:

The examiner concludes that the conduct of Lehman’s officers, while subject to question in retrospect, falls within the business judgment rule and does not give rise to colorable claims. The examiner concludes that Lehman’s directors did not breach their duty to monitor Lehman’s risks.

We rather strongly disagree.  As we pointed out months before the collapse of the company, Lehman Brothers was a poster child for how not to run a board. On the Lehman boardroom stage there was but one speaking part, that of CEO Richard Fuld.  He also served as board chairman, as well as chairman of the powerful two-man executive committee.  The only other member was 81-year-old John D. Macomber.  The executive committee met 16 times in 2007, more often than the board itself or any other committee. Lehman’s finance and risk committee was headed by 80-year-old Henry Kaufman.  It met on only two occasions during 2007 — the very time that Lehman’s destructive risk, debt and CDO time bomb was ticking away.

Five of Lehman’s directors were over 70.  Most were hand-picked by Mr. Fuld.  Many had no previous connection at all with Wall Street.  The 83-year-old actress Dina Merrill was a member of Lehman’s board and its compensation committee for 18 years until 2007. And we know that Mr. Fuld was compensated exceedingly well, to the tune of some $354 million between 2002 and 2007 alone.  Somehow it seems poetically symbolic for the kind of board Lehman was that Ms. Merrill (about whose acting career we were early young fans) should have appeared on What’s My Line? and starred in such movies as  A Nice Little Bank that Should Be Robbed and, a perennial favourite of many corporate directors, Catch Me if You Can (original 1959 version).

You can read more about Lehman’s antiquated and dysfunctional board here.

Once again, an inept board escapes culpability through a Houdini-like contrivance called the business judgment rule.  In our view, this doctrine has been shown time and again to be one of the most anti-shareholder and destructive of legal principles ever to emerge in modern times.  Talk about the need to stand up for capitalism.  There is no greater form of boardroom socialism than the business judgment rule.  Time and again, those who otherwise claim to have the intelligence and experience to govern giant corporations, and are paid handsomely for the privilege, suddenly appear to have been deaf, dumb and blind in the face of the disaster that was approaching.  They say they should not be held to account.  They claim they didn’t know what was really happening.  They stress that they tried their best. Sorry things didn’t work out.  Could they have a note from the court now so the besieged directors could go home early?

Lehman’s directors even managed to get away with this spiel at a time when the world was reeling from the unraveling of credit markets, when subprime mortgages and derivatives were sending off toxic alarms everywhere and when generally accepted standards of sound governance strongly signalled that the Lehman board was a train wreck just waiting to happen.

Fortunately, the judgment rule has few parallels that protect other professionals in a similar fashion, or society would be in an even more frantic state than it is today.  Unsurprisingly, this rule takes its origins from a time when the courts felt it only proper to defer to men of means and that nothing too arduous should be permitted to interfere with their avocational diversions.

Under this doctrine, you have to wonder, if Clarabell the Clown and the Marx Brothers had been kibitzing about while serving on the board of Lehman Brothers in the years before its collapse, would the examiner’s report have been any different?

On second thought, you don’t have to wonder.  You have your answer.